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Abstract 
Reconstituting the disarticulated political space of authoritarian breakdown is anything but straightforward. 
Distinct trade-offs and ambiguous outcomes are all too familiar. This is in no small part because political change 
involves compromise with an authoritarian past. The very fact of this transition dynamic leaves us with more 
questions than answers about the process of democratization. In particular, it is important to ask how we go 
about interpreting ambiguity in the study of democratization. The following article argues that the way we frame 
democratization is struggling to come to terms with the ambiguity of contemporary political change. Taking 
Indonesia as an example, the article maps a tension between authoritarianism and subsequent democratization. 
The story here is not merely one of opening, breakthrough, and consolidation but also (re-)negotiation. There is 
also an unfolding at the interstices of culture and politics and of that between discourse and practice. 
Unfortunately, the insight gained will not lessen some of the more undesirable aspects of Indonesia’s 
post-authoritarian outcome but it does afford us a more fine-grained reading of the reconfigured patterns of 
politics that are emerging. It may even generate discussion on how we interpret democratization and its 
dynamics of change.  
Keywords: ambiguity, contextual narratives, democratization, Indonesia, political space, re-negotiation  
1. Introduction 
It is all too easy to assume that when a country undergoes a transition from authoritarian rule it is inextricably 
moving towards democracy. This is a false assumption. Since the high water mark of the ‘Third Wave’, 
experience tells us otherwise. It may be one thing to establish formal democratic institutions, but quite another to 
sustain them over time without stagnation or reversal. In recent years, we have certainly witnessed some unusual 
patterns of transformation with numerous scholars drawing our attention to the emergence of what are more 
commonly referred to as ’hybrid regimes’( Casper 1995; Diamond 1997, 2002: 21-36; McFaul 2002: 212-244; 
Ottoway 2003; Zakaria 1997: 22-43). Neither one thing nor the other, these types of regime outwardly display 
some of the formal procedural features of ‘democracy’ but they ‘play’ by considerably different ‘rules’. From 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea Basin to Cambodia in Southeast Asia and Nigeria in West 
Africa, a major feature of this current ‘wave’ of democratization is ambiguity.  
This seems to rest on the fact that during democratization the preferences and capacities of actors reflect past 
developmental patterns and underlying societal conventions. Often times it is their own perceived self-interests 
or those of ‘reserved domains’ that end up playing significant roles in shaping events. Whilst not wanting to 
sound too pessimistic, this reality can constrain even the best of intentions. It certainly introduces a high level of 
contingency into our understandings of democratization. Yet, what it does indicate clearly is the unpredictable 
and discontinuous character of democratization.  
This article brings the above considerations into focus through one case in particular, namely Indonesia. We are 
now well over a decade since the archipelago’s initial transition and its fortunes in the intervening years afford us 
an opportunity to study ambiguity at work. Indonesia continues to not only reorganize but transform and 
regenerate. If we are to unravel this process, identifying the manner in which political actors draw upon and 
reinvent traditional identifications is an important step. The following article maps some of the contingent 
contours of this journey through the key contextual narratives of nationalism, decolonization and patrimonial 
authority. Of course, the shape Indonesian democratization is neither limited to nor conditioned in exclusivity by 
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these readily recognizable aspects of Indonesian history but relating their narrative threads to the process does 
provide a basis from which to trace a pattern of political compromise and ambiguity.  
2. Disjunctive Dynamics 
If we are to take democratization’s disjunctive dynamics seriously, we have to recognize that the process is far 
more ambiguous than a linear explanation predicated on direct casual factors presumes. In fact, trade-offs and 
unusual patterns of transformation are at the very heart of the process. We are dealing with something far beyond 
the rational capacity of political actors to bargain about clear-cut choices. As the evidence of our current wave of 
‘democratizers’ highlight the legacies of authoritarian rule remain present even as the old institutional structures 
unravel. Distinct trade-offs and ambiguous outcomes arise in no small part because change involves a 
compromise with this authoritarian past (Bermeo 1990: 359-377; Karl 1990: 1-23). There is little doubt that 
reconstituting the disarticulated political space of authoritarian breakdown is as going to be as difficult to explain, 
as it is to put into practice. The story that needs telling is not merely one of opening, breakthrough, and 
consolidation but of (re-)negotiation between culture and politics and of that between discourse and practice. 
This understanding is indebted to the insights of the work of Benedict Anderson (1991) who drew attention to 
the fact that people who perceive themselves as part of a political community ultimately imagine it. The nation is, 
therefore, a social construct that rests upon a process of invention and re-invention of traditions. In these terms, 
contextual narratives are the constitutive substance of perception and provide symbolic resources to political 
actors from which they can legitimate a post-authoritarian grammar of political action. After all, it is human 
actors shaping change in particular settings. Nonetheless, they have to turn structural factors into effective 
political resources of change in order to do so (Kim, Liddle and Said 2006: 247-268). The dynamics of which 
involve political actors drawing selectively upon symbolic narratives (the power of which is not necessarily 
tangible in the physical sense) to construct a grammar of legitimacy for their actions. One that sets in motion 
specific interpretations and interpellations that appeal to mass audiences accustomed to viewing things through 
distinctive lenses. Paradoxically, the selective utilization of both material and discursive strategies and practices 
is the enactor of a process it simultaneously constrains. In other words, in a complex interplay structure shapes 
agency as agency transforms structure into resources for change. The compromised character of a 
post-authoritarian settlement is in large part a product of the tension generated between structure and agency as 
the following will illustrate.  
3. Indonesian Nationalism 
A brief glance at Indonesia’s geography and demographics tells us that any form of nationalism there will be a 
complex phenomenon. As the world’s largest archipelago nation, it is host to vast diversity. There is five main 
islands - Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan (60 percent of Borneo), and Papua (western half of New Guinea) 
but also 17,000 other smaller islands/islets with approximately 922 of these inhabited permanently. Major ethnic 
populations include Javanese (41.7 percent), Sundanese (15.4 percent), Malay (3.45 percent), Madurese (3.4 
percent), Batak (3 percent), Minangkabau (2.7 percent), and Betawi (2.5 percent). Add in the fact that there are 
approximately 360 ethno-tribal groupings, 25 language groups, and over 250 dialects, and it is fairly clear that 
the establishing a state capable of holding this diverse conglomeration of peoples together is no mean feat. Not 
just in terms of state building capacity but in the construction a suitably wide yet integrative national identity. 
Fortunately, a shared history of anti-colonial struggle, the introduction of a shared national language (bahasa 
Indonesia) and a comprehensive state education system have all played a role in establishing a strong sense of 
national political identity.  
3.1 Nation Building, Ideology and Powerful Myths 
To elaborate, prior to full independence and at a time when the Dutch were trying to regain control over parts of 
the archipelago, there was an attempt to isolate Republican forces through a federal solution. Governor General 
Van Mook’s efforts to revive the prewar plans of the Visman Commission, however, met with forceful opposition 
and ultimately floundered. Indonesian independence leaders like Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir mobilized popular 
support around the idea of a single territorial unit of rule and a collective destiny. To encapsulate their struggle, 
these independence leaders deployed the term perasaan senasib sepenanggungan (the feeling of common fate 
and plight) and cast the Dutch as oppressors. This symbolically powerful discourse gave the diverse peoples of 
the archipelago a narrative through which to recognize themselves as a community under colonial oppression 
and imagine something different (Siegel, 1997). They rejected Dutch economic interests, language, institutional 
symbols, and practices (Bertrand 2004: 28-29). Ironically, during the years of living dangerously, Suharto would 
end up jailing novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer and banned his semi-fictional paean to Indonesian nationalism, 
the Buru Quartet. 
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3.1.1 Pancasila and Socialization 
Repressive practices aside for a moment, Sukarno sought to unite Indonesia’s different cultures behind the 
common purpose of nation building. In terms of national identity, Pancasila (panca - five; sila - principle) would 
play an instrumental role in unifying the fledgling republic. Initially, the Investigating Committee for the 
Preparation for Independence (BKI - Badan Penyeliduk Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekan Indonesia) helped 
formulate this new national ideology, later enshrined in Article 29, Section 1, of the 1945 Constitution. Pancasila 
as the official ideology of the republic linked national identity to five guiding principles - belief in one God, 
compassionate humanity, the unity of Indonesia, consensus democracy, and social justice. The purpose was to 
allow for recognition of diversity in Indonesian society while at the same time appealing to the greatest possible 
number of Indonesians. In combination with Sukarno’s presidential charisma and power, it formed “a powerful 
myth of nationhood” (Mulder 1998: 121). It also had similarities with Supomo’s idea of negara integralistik (an 
integrated state) put forward in 1945 (Simanjuntak 1994). The new national ideology became a potent political 
symbol for mobilizing the population and transcending societal cleavages. The interrelated principles of 
bhinneka tunggal ika (unity in diversity) loosely reflected and resonated with traditional Javanese values and 
traditions. This infused the national political project with symbolic markers, including musyawarah 
(deliberation), mufakat (consensus), kekeluargaan (family), manunggaling kawula (unity of the ruler and ruled), 
and gotong royong (mutual cooperation). All of which inculcated in the collective consciousness of the populace 
an image of a community that chooses a wise ruler by mutual consent. This heavy reliance on Javanese 
symbolism and cultural values did not always sit easily with other parts of the archipelago. In fact, Sukarno 
judiciously adopted the Malay of the islands as the common national language (bahasa Indonesia) to deflect 
claims of pro-Javanese bias that were all too obvious.  
3.1.2 Suharto and the Rise of the New Order 
After the fall of Sukarno (1965–1966) and the brutal purge of at least 500,000 alleged communist sympathizers, 
Suharto shifted Pancasila’s common platform of unity into a full-fledged justification for his rule (Cribb 1990). 
He selectively re-invented Pancasila for development purposes by re-deploying its vague principles as a 
legitimating grammar for his authoritarian practices. Rather than a national aspiration, in Suharto’s hands it 
became a culturally symbolic affirmation for his brand of modernizing authoritarian corporatism. There was 
nothing short of a systematic attempt to de-contest societal identity vis-à-vis the New Order (Orde Baru 
1965–1998). What Suharto’s authoritarian re-interpretation of Pancasila did was develop incrementally a 
hegemonic political discourse (bahasa pejabat) of New Order guidance. He promoted the idea of a “floating 
mass” (massa mengambang) populace to further consolidate his rule. Borrowing from Supomo’s idea of manusia 
seutuhnya (whole man of humanity) and reinterpreting it as manusia seuthisuhnya pembangunam (total 
Indonesian) infused New Order rule with corporatist ideas about organic integrated wholeness.  
Following New Order logic, a floating mass needed a paternal guide to steer them along the correct path. This 
symbolically infused assemblage tapped into and exploited cultural notions of obedience (budaya petunjuk) and 
further reinforced traditional high Javanese notions of the little people (wong cilik) as ignorant (masih bodoh). 
The logic being that their place was to remain servile (budak) and obedient (patuh) to their ruler (gusti) and 
subordinate to the dominant class (wong gede), in this case, the controllers of the state apparatus. In other words, 
by fusing the fetishized desire for modernization with ideas of traditional Javanese cosmology, Suharto went a 
long way to normalizing the New Order’s brand of authoritarianism in the Indonesian imagination. Suharto 
utilized the state bureaucracy to reinforce this symbolic positioning of the New Order by rolling out various 
socialization techniques. Civil servants and community leaders followed programmes set up by the Agency for 
Pancasila Development (BP-7) and the Pancasila Promotional Programme (P-4). In addition, schools taught 
Pancasila moral education. These mechanisms of control in the distribution of cultural knowledge allowed 
Suharto to construct a strong narrative structure around his corporatist vision. In Gramscian terms, we have an 
ideological imbrication that prioritized state above politics (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1971: 51).  
For Suharto, framing the New Order’s legitimacy in these terms allowed him the excuse to justify repression, 
electoral intimidation, and control of the media in the name of national interest. Under the auspices of the New 
Order, Pancasila became a projection of what the ruling elite deemed important, something that gradually almost 
imperceptibly normalized and internalized their authority and rule in public discourse. Once accomplished it 
virtually paralyzed the capacity for self-organization among the populace and set the stage for the sweeping 
away of all forms of dissent by intimidation, repression and co-option. Between 1983 and 1985, Suharto banned 
any organization that failed to conform to Pancasila principles. Of course, there were some notable exceptions. 
The massive socio-religious Nahdlatul Ulama (NU - Awakening of Ulama) and Muhammadiyah were only 
tolerated on the condition that they did not agitate for political change. Other voices of dissent arose from time to 
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time, but they usually gained little traction against New Order hegemony. In May 1980, for instance, public 
criticism of Suharto’s moves to redefine Pancasila to mean “loyalty to the president” met with swift and ruthless 
retaliation. Suharto banned news coverage of the high-level officials who had signed the Petisi Limapuluh (the 
Petition of Fifty) and imposed travel restrictions on them whilst rescinding their lucrative government contracts. 
It is not hard to appreciate how the internalization of this sort of intimidation and the fear of reprisal deterred 
potential dissent.  
4. Colonial Legacies, Centralized Patrimonial Authority and Qiao Sheng 
Having situated attempts to de-politicize Indonesian society within the context an evolving form of authoritarian 
rule, we can now turn to another significant configuration of the Sukarno and Suharto eras namely, patrimonial 
authority. The following genealogical reading gives us a slightly different but necessary perspective on these 
tendencies.  
In the same way as Mahmood Mamdani (1996) highlighted that colonial rule left a lasting impression in the 
African context. Similarly, Benedict Anderson (2001) argues that the image of a ‘state’ in Indonesia was a 
nineteenth-century colonial construct of defined boundaries (Anderson 2001). Taking these claims at face value 
raises a paradox. Although nationalist leaders rejected all things colonial in the catharsis of the postcolonial 
moment, the patterns of authority and exploitation established under colonialism did not simply disappear 
post-independence. In fact, they seemed to reiterate in some very strange ways. The doubling of a reflective 
image, as if a feedback loop is reproducing a distorted facsimile of vaguely familiar power-relations. 
To elaborate, in pre-independence Indonesia, the Dutch administrated the archipelago as a colonial possession 
geared primarily to extract revenues for their own self-serving interests. In a classic rule by proxy strategy, under 
the Dutch many local aristocracies gained a level of political power over state apparatus. For the Dutch, 
co-opting local powerbrokers and enforcers was the most pragmatic way of maintaining order and control. It 
created the operational mechanism through which to regulate local relations and at the same time kept the 
indigenous population trapped in an ethnically ordered system. The Dutch legacy left a reified patrimonial 
network of political elites who had acquired conditional political power as colonial proxies and a pressure cooker 
of simmering ethnic tensions. For instance, the Dutch had maintained a strategic divide between 
sino-Indonesians (qiao sheng) and native Indonesians (pribumi). They gave the former commercial and tax 
collection privileges, effectively utilizing them as an intermediary or comprador class in their commercial 
activities across the archipelago. This policy unwittingly or otherwise served to fuel pribumi distrust and 
animosity toward sino-Indonesians. Consequently, during the post-independence Sukarno era, the goal of 
building a strong pribumi business class meant that the Chinese suffered political and economic marginalization. 
4.1 Clientelism, Cronys and Cukong 
The situation remained largely the case in the Suharto era. But somewhat differently after 1965, prominent 
Chinese entrepreneurs who were select cronies of Suharto did enjoy extensive regime patronage. In a distorted 
reflection of past practices, patronage relationships formed between high-ranking state actors and 
sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs. Indonesian military men adopted the role as the “masters” of politics while 
financial backers (cukong) assumed their role as “masters” of capital (MacIntyre 2000: 248). In fact, the likes of 
Liem Sioe Liong (Sudono Salim) and The Kien Seng (Mohammad ‘Bob’ Hasan) became some of the richest 
men in Asia.  
On the other hand, this cukong system of patronage did little to alleviate resentment towards sino-Indonesians. 
Your average sino-Indonesian continued to experience insidious discrimination under the New Order including 
exclusion from the military, a lack of political representation, forced urban relocation and coercive assimilation 
practices. Day-to-day deprivations saw the routine closure or nationalization of Chinese schools, the banning of 
Chinese literature, signs, and characters and pressure to marry into pribumi families, convert to Islam, and adopt 
Indonesian sounding names. The Indonesian state even introduced specially marked identity cards, and certain 
legal restrictions. The Dutch instrumentality of maintaining a strategic divide between qiao sheng and pribumi 
became no forgotten accident of the past. Even as the new nationalist leaders were zealously trying to distance 
themselves from all things Dutch, the imprinted patterns they left behind were marks more difficult to shift. The 
spreading of the psychological stain left history to play out in a most invidious manner.  
4.2 Patrimonial Political Economy  
The reason I call this a distorted reflection of the past is not to absolve the post-independence era or claim that 
history repeats, far from it. Shining a light on these contingent contours does afford us, however, glimpses of the 
present in terms of how things end up the way they do. The new patterns and practices that emerged in the 
www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 8, No. 13; 2012 
75 
 
immediate aftermath of independence were disconcertingly familiar. For instance, the new political elite in 
Jakarta often made deals with local aristocracies, most notably in Bali, to ensure popular support for the 
fledgling republic and nationalist project. Villagers would support local elites who in turn supported central elites 
in anticipation of reciprocal benefit. Under Suharto, this precipitated an intensive centralization of authority with 
local elites firmly attached by patronage networks to a hierarchical state power-base in Jakarta. Using a mixture 
of fear and rewards across the state bureaucracy, business, and the military Suharto was able to ensured support 
for his leadership. As Harold Crouch once noted, “the New Order bore a strong resemblance to the patrimonial 
model. Political competition among the elite did not involve policy, but power and the distribution of spoils.” 
(Crouch 1979: 578) 
Having said this, the viability and legitimacy of this form of rule also depended on credible economic growth 
and development. Initially, from 1969 onwards, the national five-year development programmes (REPELITA - 
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) formed major planks of an economic interventionism. And by the late 
1970s and 1980s the switch to export oriented industrialization helped modernize the country’s infrastructure and 
transform its economic production base. Nevertheless, it was development hollowed out from within. Suharto’s 
rule eventually descended into a form of ‘sultanism’ as power and resources became increasingly concentrated 
around his personalized rule. Suharto’s control of an elaborate patronage machine that extended through Golkar 
across the archipelago ensured that virtually every important economic and political player, particularly the 
military, depended on some form of state patronage. At the same time, the rent-seeking behavior and financial 
base of Suharto’s crony capitalism relied on resource revenues, especially those generated by Pertamina (the 
state-owned oil and gas monopoly). This worked for a time at least when oil and gas exports defined Indonesia’s 
political economy and shielded it from market realities. By 1981, for example, oil and gas accounted for 82 
percent of all exports and 73 percent of government tax revenue. Nevertheless, this reliance on state patronage 
and personal favours exchanged between state officials, business interests, and community elites was a 
boomerang in motion.  
4.2.1 Repressive Development and Decline 
To elaborate, Suharto sat at the apex of not just a political structure but also “a system akin to business 
franchising.” (McLeod 2000: 101) This allowed him “to bestow privileges on selected firms, so he effectively 
awarded franchises to other government officials at lower levels to act in a similar manner.”(McLeod 2000: 101) 
As a result, state actors had a hand in most aspects of economic activity. All of which led to a pattern of 
economic growth beset by patrimonial rent-seeking and economic inequality. Suharto’s “repressive 
developmentalism” was simply too reliant on personal ‘cronyism’ and resource revenues to compete effectively 
in a globalizing economy. To put it bluntly, Suharto’s regime policies and practices ill equipped it to match the 
burgeoning economies of South Korea and other ‘Asian Tigers’. Throughout the 1980s, foreign investment fell 
due to restrictions on foreign investment and high subsidies given to state-owned companies. Richard Robison 
(1986: 105) neatly sums up the situation in Indonesia as an “entrenchment and centralization of authoritarian rule 
by the military, the appropriation of the state by its officials, and the exclusion of political parties from effective 
participation in the decision-making process.” A situation that also brought about an incremental erosion of 
confidence in Indonesia’s banking sector on world markets, especially when the regime lost all financial 
credibility in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the latter being a major catalyst in Suharto’s downfall 
in 1998. 
5. The Military, Golkar and Authoritarian Rule  
Of course, anatomizing Suharto’s patrimonial corporatism would be incomplete without mention of his two main 
props namely, the Military and Golkar. The Indonesian National Defence Force (TNI - Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia formerly known as ABRI - Angkatan Bersenjata Tentara Republik Indonesia - Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia), for instance, played a key role in Suharto’s patrimonial corporatism. Even by the 
standards of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the military occupied an unusual political and economic role in the 
regime matrix. A role that traces back to armed resistance against colonial rule that gave it a symbolic place in 
Indonesian iconography as the “guardian” of the Republic.  
Its heavy involvement in the economic sector also traces back to the nationalization of Dutch colonial companies 
in the 1950s. In the Sukarno era, military involvement in the economy became accepted practice in order to raise 
extra-budgetary revenue for operations. Its position as protector of the Republic’s integrity also led it into greater 
involvement in economic and social development (Crouch 1979). From 1958, a series of laws legitimized the 
military’s dual function (dwifungsi) within the Indonesian Republic. First, Law No. 80/1958, and MPR Decree 
No. II/1960 (A/III/404/ Sub/C) consolidated the military’s power by guaranteeing it a fixed representation in 
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Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR -People’s Consultative Assembly), Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
(DPR-House of Representatives), and local parliaments. This effectively established the military as a functional 
group of the state. Secondly, during the New Order era, Suharto further strengthened military influence across 
the political and economic landscape through Law No. 16/1969 and Law No. 5/1975. Laws that officially 
recognized the military’s dual function. By the 1980s, the military’s masuk desa programme even involved it in 
local development. Suharto also rewarded loyal military supporters with posts that offered the prospect of 
substantial material gain. Other officers entered into business under the tacit understanding that the regime 
would oblige with licenses, credit, or contracts.  
As a central prop of the New Order, it is of little surprise that it retained significant influence in the post-Suharto 
era. Although the military is no longer as powerful politically as it once was, its extensive economic presence 
makes it impossible to ignore. Institutionalized resistance to rolling-back its economic involvement is strong 
because government funding only accounts for about 30 percent of its operating budget (Singh 2000: 184-216). 
Even with constitutional reform in 2002 and the formal removal of allocated seats in parliament in 2004, it is 
clear that the military remains very much involved in the economy. Military-owned businesses operate in most 
areas of domestic investment and they are involved in various joint ventures with foreign and Chinese partners. 
The fact that the military’s territorial structure remains largely intact also ensures access to ‘revenues’ from 
fishing and logging to coffee production. The KODAM (regional military commands), KOREM (sub-regional 
military commands), and KODIM (district military commands) are all involved in ‘self-funding’ activity usually 
organized through a network of yayasan (foundations similar to NGOs), not to mention illegal levies, smuggling, 
and protection rackets (McCulloch 2003: 94-124).  
5.1 Golkar, Hegemony and Patronage  
On the operational side, Golkar was the other key player in Suharto’s patrimonial corporatist matrix. Its 
prototype emerged during the Sukarno era in 1963 as the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups. This ABRI led 
initiative allowed the military to mobilize support against Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI -Indonesian 
Communist Party). In 1965, Suharto with the help of General Ali Murtopo turned the various groups of military 
officers, civil servants, technocrats, government officials, administrators, and educators into the political 
machinery of the New Order state. The “restructuring” of Indonesia’s political party system also facilitated its 
dominant role. By 1971, Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI – Indonesian Democratic Party) and PPP, 
were the only three permitted state-licensed political parties. Golkar dominated the other two parties through 
distribution of patronage and allocation of resources combined with a virtual monopoly on communications and 
funding (MacIntyre 2000: 248-273). The elections of 3 July 1971 cemented Golkar’s position in Indonesia’s 
political firmament with 62.8 percent of the vote and 227 of the 351 seats in the DPR. After its first congress in 
Surabaya in 1973, Golkar then amalgamated its constituent groups into a single powerful state cadre with an 
instantly recognizable symbolic identity. Golkar’s unrivaled access to state revenues combined with its 
distinctive organizational structure gave it a vast territorial reach at all levels of society and allowed it to 
dominate national and local legislatures and by extension the political life of the archipelago. 
All of which allowed Suharto to operationalize his brand of patrimonial authority via a vast alliance of state 
officials, business interests, and community elites all the way down the chain to the village level. The executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of the Indonesian state were little more than strands in a hegemonic web of 
corruption and graft. Suharto also knew enough about maintaining power to deny Golkar any major policy 
formation role or strong programmatic platform (Tomsa 2008). Suharto’s mastery of divide-and-rule strategies to 
create internal factions kept Golkar from having strong leadership capable of challenging him. He used it more 
as a personal political vehicle, pressing it into service to mobilize public support and secure his reappointment as 
president. In fact, Golkar’s status as a significant political party in the post-Suharto era rests less on its 
programmatic merits and more on its ability to take advantage of its hegemonic past. 
6. Conclusion 
In common with other transitions, the political euphoria that accompanied Indonesia’s crumbling authoritarian 
regime raised expectations very high. Yet, as any observer of the Indonesian transition will tell you, it has been 
no easy ride since 1998 (Slater 2008: 208-213; Hadiz 2003: 591-611). The reason for this is that a transition is an 
entrance into a period of uncertainty. A period characterized by opportunity but also fraught with danger. What 
this article has established is that whilst regime downfall can be sudden, as it was in Indonesia, inherited 
constraints fade much less quickly. It also outlined tentatively a way of understanding Indonesia’s democratic 
rearrangement vis-à-vis the legacies of the past.  
The compromises necessary to ensure relative stability and a peaceful transition always disappoint in some 
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respects. Despite a ‘new’ social contract, ambiguities abound. Patronage and old loyalties do persist if in a 
somewhat adapted form. This sort of modified continuation means the archipelago continues to experience 
widespread corruption, and officials especially the judiciary, remain open to bribery and graft (Hadiz 2004: 
55-71). One need only look at the scandals surrounding the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), the 
State Logistics Agency (Bulog), or the Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) to get a sense of the scale of 
the problem. Having said this, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK - Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) and Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK - Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) has made some inroads against an endemic 
nexus of corruption and graft but it is without doubt a fraught and uneven struggle (Mulia 2008).  
In many instances, community interests continue to remain marginalized and subordinate to the interests of local 
patrons of national parties. These situations are no more keenly felt than in provinces like Kalimantan and Papua 
Barat (West Papua). Yet, one of the encouraging effects of change is that there is now at least some 
acknowledgement of the regions. The 2004 election inaugurated the new Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD - 
Regional Representatives Council). It does constitute, in a narrow sense, a second chamber of elected 
representatives albeit with extremely limited powers. Taking a quick look at the fringes of national politics, there 
is also a number of minor opposition parties that represent labor interests. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PUDI - Democratic Unity Party–Indonesia) Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN - National Labour Party) and Partai 
Pekerja Indonesia (PPI - The Indonesian Workers’ Party), for instance, have some influence in and around 
Jakarta. But the parties just mentioned continue to lack broad appeal and show little signs of consolidating a 
political base capable of challenging for power (Johnson Tan 2006: 88-114).  
Evidently, the establishment of multiparty democracy is a struggle against the patterns of the past. If one looks at 
the experience of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P, for instance, the challenge is patently obvious. Given her 
lineage, Megawati had wide appeal and played a key role in Indonesia’s transition. She garnered mass support 
from rural, urban middle class, and working class constituencies. Yet, despite the wave of euphoria, her PDI-P 
party was organizationally weak and lacked an effective party structure capable of maintaining the popular 
support of 1999. On the other hand, Golkar, a discredited force in the 1999 election, retained its organizational 
reach to a large extent. This allowed it to claw back its vote in 2004. At the same time, its past imbued it with 
some distinctive and unmistakable weaknesses. Golkar’s status as a significant political party in the post-Suharto 
era rests more on a hegemonic legacy than its programmatic or leadership merits. What Partai Demokrat’s (PD - 
Democratic Party) election victory in 2009 indicated was that Golkar’s electoral success relied more on it taking 
advantage of an uneven political playing field than unequivocal institutional strength on its part.  
Evidently, Indonesia’s transformation, in common with other democratizations, has been anything but 
straightforward. The legacies of the past have made democratic re-arrangement vis-à-vis political power a 
complicated affair. Indonesia has had to face up to substantial challenges (and is still doing so) but, at the same 
time, it has managed to come through such a process and registered some quiet remarkable achievements over 
the 13 years since its initial transition (McBride 2004: 396-420). There may be ongoing policy ineffectiveness, 
judicial problems, institutional frictions and corruption issues but what is clear is that there has been substantive 
reform. The political system is now a functioning democracy with all its benefits and shortcomings. Success 
depended, in the Przeworskian (1991) sense, on relevant political forces working out how best to continue to 
submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of democratic institutions. Translating momentum for 
change into representational capacity with the ability to yield meaningful reform and improvements took time, 
commitment and vigilance. In fact, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) may be ex-military but he is 
politically committed to the new democratic framework. And although high in the rhetoric stakes, he has at least 
sought to stabilize the economy, combat terrorism and make inroads against corruption. The institutional reforms 
of the post-Suharto political system have, albeit modestly, widened contestation that, in turn, created a more 
inclusive form of politics. No matter how constrained this potential is it has improved the system of governance. 
From what has just been said about democratization in Indonesia, it should come as no real surprise that the kind of 
democracy (hybrid or otherwise) establishing itself does exhibit patrimonial tendencies (Webber 2006: 396-420). 
Political change after all occurs through time by way of contestation, destabilization, and reconstitution. There are 
no simple explanations, but rather matters of time and degree. This often means regressions, breakdowns, and 
unexpected patterns of transformation. We are not watching a linear trajectory to a predetermined endpoint but a 
renegotiation between a country’s own history, culture, and identity. In fact, the process resists simple 
categorization as it oscillates between uncertainty, continuity, and change. Institutional outcomes will reflect 
disjunctive dynamics; constructing their own specificity in a nonlinear reiterative interplay between structure and 
agency. In short, ambiguity is to democratization as push is to shove.  
If we are to accept this proposition then, reading multiple narratives into the context of a country’s 
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democratization is a useful step in unraveling ambiguity in post-authoritarian situations. For instance, by 
anatomizing and locating key aspects of Indonesia’s past, in particular the New Order era, we can see it had 
certain material and ideational characteristics. They did not simply disappear in the aftermath of Suharto but 
actually constituted a significant part of the contingent terrain of Indonesia’s unfolding democratization. The 
subsequent interplay between political decisions and embedded institutional rigidities and culturally informed 
practices shaped the democracy establishing itself. Indeed, ambiguity is the compromise we live with from the 
contestation and reinterpretation of these realities. 
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